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Élitisme et Dominance Stochastique  
Résumé 
La dominance stochastique est traditionnellement associée à la mesure du risque et de 
l’inégalité et repose sur la concavité de la fonction d’utilité. Nous prétendons que 
l’approche en terme de dominance stochastique a des implications qui vont au-delà de 
la mesure du risque et de l’inégalité pour peu que l’on procède à certains ajustements. 
Nous appliquons ici la dominance stochastique à la mesure de l’élitisme, notion qui 
peut d’une certaine manière être considérée comme le contraire de l’égalitarisme. Alors 
que les critères de dominance stochastique habituels accordent plus de valeur aux 
distributions qui sont à la fois moins inégales et plus eﬃcientes, nos critères 
garantissent qu’une distribution sera d’autant mieux classée qu’une autre qu’elle est à 
la fois plus eﬃciente et plus inégale. Aﬁn d’illustrer notre approche, nous proposons 
deux exemples : (i) la comparaison d’une vingtaine de départements d’économie en 
Europe du point de vue de la performance scientiﬁque, et (ii) la comparaison de 
diﬀérents pays sur la base de la notion d’aﬄuence par opposition à celle de pauvreté. 
Mots-clés  :  Fonction de Distribution Décumulative, Dominance Stochastique, 
Transferts Régressifs, Élitisme, Performance Scientiﬁque, Aﬄuence 
 
Elitism and Stochastic Dominance 
Abstract 
Stochastic dominance has been typically used with a special emphasis on risk and in-
equality reduction something captured by the concavity of the utility function in the 
expected utility model. We claim that the applicability of the stochastic dominance ap-
proach goes far beyond risk and inequality measurement provided suitable adaptations 
be made. We apply in the paper the stochastic dominance approach to the measurement 
of elitism which may be considered the opposite of egalitarianism. While the usual 
stochastic dominance quasi-orderings attach more value to more equal and more eﬃ-
cient distributions, our criteria ensure that, the more unequal and the more eﬃcient the 
distribution, the higher it is ranked. Two instances are provided by (i) comparisons of 
scientiﬁc performance across institutions like universities or departments, and (ii) com-
parisons of aﬄuence as opposed to poverty between countries. 
Keywords: Decumulative Distribution Functions, Stochastic Dominance, Regressive 
Transfers, Elitism, Scientiﬁc Performance, Aﬄuence 
JEL : D31, D63 
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1. Introduction
The stochastic dominance approach has been used in the areas of choice under uncertainty
and inequality measurement for some time with a reasonable degree of success. A ﬁrst advan-
tage of this method of making comparisons is that all the distinct features that characterise
the distributions under consideration are reﬂected in the ranking one obtains. Contrary to
summary measures that aggregate the various characteristics of the distributions under re-
view into a single index, the dominance criteria do not allow for such trade-oﬀs. A second
advantage is that the (partial) ranking one obtains is in accordance with a large spectrum of
value judgements typically captured by the properties of the utility functions. By choosing
ethically appealing properties for the utility functions and by requiring a consensus among the
corresponding class of value judgements, one ends up with a ranking that is consistent with all
the views reﬂected in this class. The properties that are considered relevant depend obviously
on the question addressed and are open to debate. However it is a property common to all
the stochastic dominance quasi-orderings that have been used up to now that modiﬁcations
of the distributions that increase eﬃciency and equality improve welfare.
We claim that the applicability of the stochastic dominance approach is not limited to
risk and inequality measurement, and that it can provide insights in other domains so long
as suitable adjustments are made. In the income inequality literature it is assumed that the
more equal the distribution is the better the society. Similarly, in the risk literature less
risky prospects – that is lotteries whose outcomes are more concentrated around the expected
value – are always preferable to riskier ones. There are however instances where it is not
that clear whether a situation is considered superior as the result of a reduction of inequality
or dispersion. In particular, we think of a concept like elitism which can be regarded as
the opposite of egalitarianism. Let us make clear right from the beginning that we are not
concerned here with the attitude of a group of people – like a caste – which is intent on
defending privileges inherited from history or tradition. We rather have in mind the notion of
excellence whether it is the result of innate talents or the attainment of characteristics giving
rise to higher performance. We distinguish two diﬀerent – even though they are not totally
independent – ways of conceiving of elitism.
The ﬁrst interpretation originates in the attitude according to which a person wants to be
among the best (say among the top 5%) in a particular domain such as music, sport, research,
or politics, and does everything in order to achieve this objective. It is a personal quest of
excellence originating in the individual’s own preferences which may in turn be determined
in part by her personal circumstances such as her family background or her socio-cultural
environment. Then, one might be interested in measuring the overall extent of elitism in a
particular dimension (income, intelligence, research performance) for the entire society. This
evaluation necessitates that we decide (i) what is the threshold above which an individual can
be considered an elitist in the particular dimension of interest, and (ii) what is the appropriate
method of aggregating the individuals’ achievements in terms of excellence to arrive at an
overall measure of elitism in the society.
The second interpretation is policy oriented and it builds upon the idea that – because of
technological constraints – it might be more eﬃcient for the society to concentrate resources
on the more talented of its members rather than distribute them evenly in the population.
Elitism is then understood as the recognition that some groups of individuals deserve particular
attention because they have speciﬁc skills, abilities, intellect, experience or wealth that are
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most likely to be constructive to society as a whole. To be more precise, it is a more eﬀective
arrangement from a social point of view to concentrate resources on the elite – those who
are more talented – rather than on the less privileged. Greater inequality of resources –
which in this context is regarded as a transfer of resources from the less endowed to the more
endowed – is a means of achieving higher performance which in turn may be of beneﬁt to all.
Elitist policies are frequently invoked in areas such as education, technology, innovation or
scientiﬁc research, and always in connection with the pursuit of greater economic performance.
This leaves open the questions to know how eﬃciency and talents are deﬁned and measured.
This approach necessitates among other things that one (i) identiﬁes the factors (technology,
preferences) that explain why a more unequal allocation of resources in favour of the more
talented gives rise to a better outcome, and (ii) speciﬁes what is meant by a more eﬀective
arrangement – one may think for instance of the possibility of compensating the disadvantaged
– that justiﬁes such a position. 1
The ﬁrst conception of elitism is a purely descriptive approach which aims at deriving
an overall measure of excellence in the society starting with the individuals’ achievements in
terms of excellence. To this extent, it is reminiscent of the way one typically thinks of poverty
measurement in the economic literature: one ﬁrst identiﬁes the poor population and then one
aggregates the deprivations of the poor to get an overall measure of poverty. It is immaterial
whether the variable of interest is a factor contributing to (e.g. talent) or resulting from (e.g.
income) the production process. On the contrary, the second conception of elitism involves
a behavioural model where agents make decisions on the basis of their preferences but where
their decisions have diﬀering impacts on the economic outcome due to the fact that they
have diﬀerent talents. 2 We are interested here in the measurement of elitism and we do not
address the important question of knowing under which circumstances elitist policies prove to
be socially more eﬀective than egalitarian policies, even though this important political issue
is in the background.
As a matter of illustration, we consider two examples where the concern for elitism has
given rise to conﬂicting views in the public and among politicians. Our ﬁrst example is related
to the question of what is the most eﬀective way for increasing a society’s well-being: focusing
on the poor and implementing transfers to improve their situations or designing policies in
order to increase aﬄuence in the society. Following Sen’s inﬂuential contribution (see e.g.
Sen (1976), Sen (1992, Chapter 7)), there is considerable interest in the impact on poverty
of changes in the shape of the distribution of personal income. It is typically admitted that
the alleviation of poverty is a main objective in modern societies in order to achieve greater
well-being. This is mirrored in the discussion among politicians and the public about a more
aﬄuent society which is seen as synonymous with a reduction in poverty. However, this
assumes that aﬄuence and poverty are just two sides of the same coin and that dominance
of one distribution over another is associated with greater aﬄuence. The connection between
stochastic dominance criteria and the measurement of poverty has long been recognised (see
e.g. Foster and Shorrocks (1988)). If one distribution stochastically dominates another, then
poverty is unambiguously less in the former distribution than in the latter, and conversely.
1 The simplest model one may think of would consist of (i) a planner maximising a symmetric, monotone
and concave function of the society’s members’ utilities, (ii) a production process where the more talented
always produce more with the same resources than the less talented, and (iii) a costless ex-post redistribution
process
2 Considering an artisan economy with no taxation, Ebert and Moyes (2010) have investigated the impact on
the income distribution of particular changes in the allocation of talents among agents.
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Does that mean that a decrease in poverty as measured by stochastic dominance is always
equivalent to a decrease in aﬄuence? Actually this is not necessarily the case as we will
show below unless the distributions under consideration have equal means, which rules out
the potential conﬂict between equality and eﬃciency.
A second example in which elitism would seem to be particularly relevant is the measure-
ment of the scientiﬁc performance of academics and institutions in terms of research which
is now common practice in most countries. Articles, taken as an evidence of research output,
are given values that may depend among other things on the ranking and impact factors of
the journals where they are published or on the number of citations they receive. Our start-
ing point is the recognition that every evaluation process involves value judgements whether
they are explicit or not. The adoption of one set of value judgements or another generally
leads to diﬀerent rankings in terms of scientiﬁc performance. It is therefore important to
understand the value judgements contained implicitly in the measures used when proceeding
to the evaluation. A routinely used index may possess properties that make it unsuitable for
making comparisons of scientiﬁc performance. Also universities, departments, research cen-
ters or academics are expected to implement – possibly conﬂicting – strategies in response to
the way their scientiﬁc performance is evaluated. A researcher is generally considered to be
active if her output is satisfactory in a quantitative sense. However, scholars establish their
individual reputation by having their articles published in the top-ranked journals. There
may indeed be a conﬂict between individuals’ publishing strategies and the objectives of their
research institute or department. An examination of the literature reveals that, with a few
exceptions, most studies compute summary statistics in order to compare the scientiﬁc per-
formance of institutions and academics (see among others Combes and Linnemer (2003) for
France, Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas, and Stengos (1999, 2003) and Lubrano, Bauwens, Kirman,
and Protopopescu (2003) for Europe, Dusansky and Vernon (1998) for the US, and Coupé
(2003) for the World). It is true that some authors have examined distribution of the scientiﬁc
output of academic institutions. Lubrano and Protopopescu (2004) compare seven European
countries using statistical estimates of density function of publication scores of economics de-
partments and apply stochastic dominance techniques to rank countries. Unlike the present
paper, their approach is statistical and is not based on explicit normative foundations. An
unpublished paper by Carayol and Lahatte (2009) also takes into account the distributional
aspect of scientiﬁc output in a comparison of French academic institutions in all disciplines
other than humanities and social sciences. The criteria they use to compare institutions are
very diﬀerent from those that arise from the normative foundations based on the notion of
elitism.
In this paper we suggest that the technique of stochastic dominance can be used to com-
pare the degree of elitism – be it in terms of income or publication scores – of diﬀerent
societies. This of course calls for an adaptation of the properties of the utility function –
or as we call it, the value function – retained for assessing the contribution of the members
in a society. It is reasonable to maintain that the value function is non-decreasing with an
individual’s contribution as in the standard stochastic dominance approach. However, while
a more equal distribution is always considered a desirable thing under standard stochastic
dominance, elitism carries the idea that more concentration at the top of the scale results in
a social improvement. Formally this can be conceived in terms of a regressive transfer that
consists in increasing the contribution of the more endowed at the expense of less endowed
individuals. Whereas the concavity of the utility function guarantees that social welfare – as
measured by the sum of utilities – decreases as the result of a regressive transfer, it is claimed
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that elitism increases when the value function is convex. Because convexity is the opposite of
concavity, it is tempting to appeal to standard second degree stochastic dominance and declare
that the performance of society A is superior to that of society B if A second degree stochastic
dominates B. However, this is not the case because the conditions we impose – namely that
performance increases as the result of increments and regressive transfers – come into conﬂict
under standard second degree stochastic dominance. Substituting the survival function – or
the decumulative distribution function as we call it in the paper – for the cumulative distribu-
tion function will resolve the diﬃculty. Then, it can be shown that one distribution generates
greater elitism than another whatever the value function provided it is increasing and convex
if and only if the integral of the survival function of the ﬁrst distribution is nowhere below
that of the second distribution. Similarly, convexity of the derivative of the value function is
both necessary and suﬃcient for performance to increase when a regressive transfer among
the more talented is coupled with a progressive transfer among less talented individuals in
such a way that the variance is preserved. The quasi-orderings we obtain are shown to depart
signiﬁcantly from the standard stochastic dominance criteria even though they are admittedly
very close in spirit.
We present in Section 2 our conceptual framework and argue in favour of a consensual
approach for comparing societies from the point of view of elitism. We introduce in Section
3 diﬀerent classes of value functions that are believed to capture essential dimensions of the
achievements of a society and we identify the corresponding dominance criteria. As a matter of
illustration, we apply our criteria in Section 4 to the comparison of aﬄuence across diﬀerent
countries and to the comparison of European economics departments in terms of scientiﬁc
performance and we contrast the rankings we get with those arising from the application of
standard stochastic dominance. We conclude in Section 5 and sketch the proofs of the results
in Section 6.
2. The Framework
We are interested in the comparisons of diﬀerent societies from the point of view of their
performance where the latter is determined by the distribution of some cardinal attribute.
These societies can be seen as economies, universities, departments, or research centers. The
attribute, whose distribution we are interested in, may be income, publication scores, talents
or the results of intelligence tests. We adopt a discrete framework and we associate a society
with its attribute proﬁle x := (x1,...,xn(x)), where xi indicates the endowment of individual i
in the attribute and where n(x) is the dimension of the proﬁle x. We assume throughout that
n(x) = 3 and xi ∈ D, where D = [s,s] ⊂ R. Because all the criteria we will consider below for
making comparisons in terms of elitism are symmetric – a permutation of endowments within
the societies does not change the results – we henceforth suppose without loss of generality
that the individuals’ endowments are arranged in the non-decreasing order. We use Sn(D) to
represent the set of proﬁles involving n individuals and let
(2.1) S(D) :=
[+∞
n=3 Sn(D)
represent the general set of proﬁles. The arithmetic mean of proﬁle x ∈ S(D) is denoted
as µ(x) :=
Pn(x)
i=1 xi/n(x). The density function of x ∈ S(D) is indicated by f(s;x) :=
n(s;x)/n(x), for all s ∈ (−∞,+∞), where n(s;x) := #{i ∈ {1,2,...,n(x)} | xi = s}. We
denote as F(·;x) the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of x ∈ S(D) deﬁned by F(s;x) :
= q(s;x)/n(x), for all s ∈ (−∞,+∞), where q(s;x) := #{i ∈ {1,2,...,n(x)} | xi 5 s}. We
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let Q(·;x) represent the inverse cumulative distribution function (icdf) – or equivalently, the
quantile function – of x obtained by letting Q(0;x) := x1 and
(2.2) Q(p;x) := inf
n
s ∈ (−∞,+∞)

  F(s;x) = p
o
, ∀p ∈ (0,1]
(see Gastwirth (1971)). It is convenient to introduce the decumulative distribution function
(ddf) – also known as the survival function – of x ∈ S(D) deﬁned by DF(s;x) := 1−F(s;x),
for all s ∈ (−∞,+∞). Letting r(s;x) := #{i ∈ {1,2,...,n(x)} | xi > s}, we note that
DF(s;x) := r(s;x)/n(x), for all s ∈ (−∞,+∞). We indicate by RQ(p;x) the inverse
decumulative distribution function (iddf) – or equivalently, the reverse quantile function – of
x deﬁned by RQ(1;x) := x1 and
(2.3) RQ(p;x) := sup
n
s ∈ (−∞,+∞)


 DF(s;x) 5 p
o
, ∀p ∈ [0,1).
It follows from the deﬁnition of the reverse quantile function that RQ(p;x) = Q(1−p;x), for
all x ∈ S(D) and all p ∈ [0,1].
We follow the utilitarian – or equivalently, the expected utility – tradition and we assume
that the performance of a society with proﬁle x ∈ S(D) is given by
(2.4) Wv(x) :=
1
n(x)
n(x) X
i=1
v (xi) ≡
Z s
s
v(s)f(s;x)ds,
where v is the value function deﬁned up to an increasing aﬃne transformation. We assume
that the value function v is continuous and diﬀerentiable up to the third order and we indicate
by V (D) such a set. We refer the reader to Fishburn and Vickson (1978) for a rigorous
justiﬁcation of this way of proceeding. Given two proﬁles x,y ∈ S(D), we will say that proﬁle
x is a replication of proﬁle y if there exists an integer r = 2 such that x = (y1;...;yn(y)),
where yi := (yi,...,yi) ∈ Dr, for all i = 1,2,...,n(y), and n(x) = rn(y). It follows directly
from deﬁnition (2.4) that performance is not modiﬁed by a replication: Wv(x) = Wv(y)
whenever x is a replication of y. Before we proceed further we would like to insist on the
fact that we are interested in the ranking of proﬁles in terms of performance. This means
among other things that we prevent ourselves from concluding that proﬁle x does twice as
much as proﬁle y in terms of performance if it happens that Wv(x) = 2Wv(y). Similarly we
resist making the judgement that the diﬀerence in performance between proﬁles x and y is
greater than the diﬀerence in performance between proﬁles z and t because Wv(x)−Wv(y) >
Wv(z) − Wv(t). This means that societal performance is measured on an ordinal scale and
that any increasing transformation of Wv(·) provides the same information as does the original
performance function. For instance, choosing
(2.5) Ξv(x) := v
−1

 1
n(x)
n(x) X
i=1
v (xi)


as a measure of performance would not modify the ranking of proﬁles implied by (2.4). This
measure of performance is reminiscent of what is known as the equally distributed income in
the inequality literature.
The value function v captures the attitude of an observer – be it the policy maker, either
author of this paper or anyone who is willing to play this role – concerning the way the
distribution of the attribute among the society’s members determines its performance. Clearly,
choosing an arbitrary value function v ∈ V (D) results in a particular ordering of the proﬁles
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under comparison. For instance, substituting v(s) = s into (2.5) amounts to measuring the
performance of a proﬁle by the arithmetic mean, while taking v(s) = lns would result in the
geometric mean. Having the evaluation of performance in mind we expect that certain value
functions are more appropriate than others. Before turning to the question of which speciﬁc
properties of the value function are deemed relevant when one is interested in comparing
performance across proﬁles, we ﬁrst suggest a strategy that avoids relying exclusively on a
particular value function. Suppose that the subclass V ∗(D) of possible value functions consists
of all those value functions that are relevant for measuring the contribution of an individual
to the performance of the society. Then, we will say that proﬁle x does unanimously no worse
in terms of performance than proﬁle y, which we write x ≥V ∗ y, if
(2.6) Wv(x) = Wv(y), ∀ v ∈ V
∗(D).
The obvious question that will occupy us in the next section is to know (i) what this partial
ordering of the proﬁles under comparison would look like, and (ii) how it is altered as the
result of changes in the class of relevant value functions.
3. Three Dominance Criteria
We claimed above that the assessment of a society’s performance is a normative exercise that
involves value judgements. The ﬁrst stage in this assessment process is to choose the overall
performance evaluation function which we assume here is of the utilitarian type deﬁned by
(2.4) and is given once-and-for-all. The second stage is to determine the properties of the value
function that are deemed desirable. We follow the traditional practice in welfare economics
which consists (i) in suggesting elementary transformations of the proﬁles that are expected to
improve performance, and (ii) in identifying the restrictions they impose on the value function
for performance as measured by (2.4) to increase. Before we address these questions, we would
like to introduce an example that we will invoke repeatedly in order to illustrate various points.
Example 3.1. Consider the three following proﬁles which for simplicity have the same number
of individuals: x1 = (1,4,5,8), x2 = (2,3,5,6) and x3 = (2,4,5,7). We note incidently that,
if one chooses the arithmetic mean as the index of performance, then proﬁles x1 and x3 are
equivalent and rank above proﬁle x2.
We are conﬁdent that nobody would object to the judgement that performance increases
– or at least does not decrease – when, other things equal, the endowment of one individual
increases. Given two proﬁles x,y ∈ S(D) with n(x) = n(y), we will say that proﬁle x is
obtained from proﬁle y by means of an increment if there exists ∆ > 0 and an individual i
such that
(3.1) xi = yi + ∆ and xj = yj, ∀ j 6= i.
Examination of Example 3.1 reveals that proﬁle x2 is converted into proﬁle x3 by means of two
increments and that there are no other cases where one proﬁle can be obtained from another by
means of increments. It does not take long to recognise that performance as measured by (2.4)
improves as the result of an increment if and only if the value function v is non-decreasing.
We indicate by
(3.2) V1(D) := {v ∈ V (D) | v
0(s) = 0, ∀ s}
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the class of value functions that are non-decreasing. It is therefore natural to appeal to
value functions in the class V1(D) in order to evaluate the performance of diﬀerent societies.
However, the fact that elements in the class V1(D) all have in common that they record
increments as improvements of a society’s performance does not imply that they agree on
the ranking of the societies under comparison. Consider for instance the value functions
v◦(s) = s2 and v∗(s) =
√
s that are both increasing and belong to V1(D). Then, we obtain
that Wv◦(x1) > Wv◦(x3) while Wv∗(x1) < Wv∗(x3). It is interesting to investigate in which
circumstances one would get the same ranking of two arbitrary proﬁles x and y irrespective
of the choice of a value function provided it be non-decreasing. The unanimity condition
(2.6) with V ∗(D) = V1(D) precisely avoids conﬂicting views regarding the choice of the value
function. However seductive such a criterion is, the diﬃculty is that it is impossible to apply
it in practice as it requires an inﬁnite number of pairwise comparisons to be made in order to
decide when one proﬁle is unambiguously better than another. There is therefore a need for
practical procedures that will allow one to check whether condition (2.6) holds or not, when
V ∗(D) = V1(D). The following result, which is a straightforward adaptation of standard
results in the risk and inequality literature (see e.g. Saposnik (1981), Fishburn and Vickson
(1978)), proposes two such procedures in order to implement unanimity over the class of
non-decreasing value functions.
Theorem 3.1. Let x,y ∈ S(D). The following three statements are equivalent:
(a) Wv(x) = Wv(y), for all v ∈ V1(D).
(b) DF(s;x) = DF(s;y), for all s ∈ [s,s].
(c) RQ(p;x) = RQ(p;y), for all p ∈ [0,1].
Statement (b) of Theorem 3.1, which involves the decumulative distribution functions – or
equivalently the survival functions – of proﬁles x and y, deﬁnes ﬁrst order decumulative
stochastic dominance. More precisely, we will say that proﬁle x ﬁrst order decumulative
stochastic dominates proﬁle y if the percentage of individuals whose endowments in x are
greater or equal to s is not less than the corresponding percentage in y, whatever the value s
takes in the interval [s,s]. Statement (c) involves the quantiles of x and y but arranged in
reverse order of endowments – from top to bottom – and we will say that proﬁle x reverse
quantile dominates proﬁle y when it holds. At ﬁrst sight, statements (b) and (c) of Theorem
3.1 depart somewhat from the conditions one encounters in the standard ﬁrst order stochastic
dominance results. However, since DF(s;x) − DF(s;y) = 0 implies F(s;x) − F(s;y) 5 0,
for all s ∈ [s,s], for ﬁrst order dominance it does not make any diﬀerence whether we use the
cumulative or decumulative distribution functions. Nor does the ranking of proﬁles change
when one appeals to the quantile and reverse quantile functions. As we will see in a while,
things appear to be diﬀerent when we move to dominance criteria of higher orders, unless one
imposes special restrictions on the proﬁles under comparison.
The monotonicity of the value function ensures that the performance attached to a proﬁle
improves as soon as one individual experiences an increase in her endowment irrespective of
her relative position on the attribute scale. From the point of view of performance it makes
sense to attach more value to increments aﬀecting individuals who rank at the top rather than
at the bottom of the scale. Put diﬀerently, the more concentrated endowments are at the
top of the attribute scale, the greater the performance of the society. This idea is formally
captured by the concept of a mean preserving spread in the risk literature. Here we borrow the
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approach of the inequality literature and, given two proﬁles x,y ∈ S(D) with n(x) = n(y),
we will say that proﬁle x is obtained from proﬁle y by means of a regressive transfer if there
exists ∆ > 0 and two individuals i and j such that
yh = xh, ∀ h 6= i,j; (3.3a)
yi = xi + ∆; yj = xj − ∆; (3.3b)
∆ ≤ (xj − xi)/2. (3.3c)
We note that by deﬁnition a regressive transfer leaves the mean of the distribution unchanged:
µ(x) = µ(y). A regressive transfer consists in increasing the endowment of a highly ranked
individual at the expense of a decrease of the endowment of a lower ranked individual so
long as their relative positions remain unaltered. Going back to Example 3.1, we note that
proﬁle x1 is obtained from proﬁle x3 by means of a regressive transfer of one unit involving
the ﬁrst and fourth individuals while one increment and two regressive transfers are needed to
transform x2 into x1 It can be easily seen that convexity of the value function is both necessary
and suﬃcient for performance to increase as the result of a regressive transfer. Consider two
proﬁles x and y verifying condition (3.3), hence x is derived from y by means of a regressive
transfer. Then, Wv(x) = Wv(y) is equivalent to
(3.4) v (yi) − v (xi) 5 v (xj) − v (yj).
Upon integrating, condition (3.4) reduces to
(3.5)
Z ∆
0
v
0 (xi + s) ds 5
Z ∆
0
v
0 (yj + s) ds,
which, since xi < yj, holds if v0(s) is non-decreasing with s. That the latter condition is
also necessary for performance to increase as the result of a regressive transfer is readily
seen. For suppose v is not convex, in which case there exist s,t ∈ D with s < t such that
2v((s + t)/2) > v(s) + v(t). 3 Choosing for instance x = (s,t) and y = ((s + t)/2,(s + t)/2)),
we obtain Wv(x) < Wv(y). We indicate by
(3.6) V2(D) := {v ∈ V (D) | v
0(s) = 0 and v
00(s) = 0, ∀ s}
the class of non-decreasing and convex value functions. Because V2(D) ⊂ V1(D), the appli-
cation of unanimity over the class V2(D) will result in a ﬁner ranking of the proﬁles under
comparison than the one that would have obtained from the application of the same principle
to the class V1(D). But this does not provide much guidance on the nature of the procedures
that enable dominance to be detected with the exception that they will be consistent with
conditions (b) and (c) of Theorem 3.1. The following result, which presents the procedures
for implementing unanimous agreement for all non-decreasing and convex value functions, is
not that surprising.
Theorem 3.2. Let x,y ∈ S(D). The following three statements are equivalent:
(a) Wv(x) = Wv(y), for all v ∈ V2(D).
(b)
Z s
s
DF(t;x)dt =
Z s
s
DF(t;y)dt, for all s ∈ [s,s].
(c)
Z p
0
RQ(ξ;x)dξ =
Z p
0
RQ(ξ;y)dξ, for all p ∈ [0,1].
3 This argument exploits the continuity of the value function v: for a justiﬁcation see for instance Hardy,
Littlewood, and Pólya (1952, Chapter 3).
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Figure 3.1: Integrals of the cumulative distribution functions of x1, x2 and x3
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Figure 3.2: Integrals of the decumulative distribution functions of x1, x2 and x3
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Statement (b) of Theorem 3.2 deﬁnes second order decumulative stochastic dominance: if
and only if the integral of the decumulative distribution function of proﬁle x is nowhere
below that of proﬁle y will we say that x second order decumulative stochastic dominates y.
Similarly, we will say that proﬁle x reverse generalised Lorenz dominates proﬁle y if its reverse
generalised Lorenz curve lies nowhere below that of y, which is statement (c) of Theorem
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Figure 3.3: Generalised Lorenz curves of x1, x2 and x3
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Figure 3.4: Reverse generalised Lorenz curves of x1, x2 and x3
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3.2. We should ﬁrst emphasise the distinction between standard second degree stochastic
dominance and statement (b) of Theorem 3.2. Second degree stochastic dominance requires
that the cumulative distribution functions be integrated from s up to s. In our case it is
the decumulative distribution functions that have to be integrated and integration must be
performed from s up to s. Contrary to what is the case in Theorem 3.1, the application of
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standard second order stochastic dominance procedures and the criterion deﬁned by condition
(b) in Theorem 3.2 generally lead to diﬀering rankings of the proﬁles. Actually, the rankings of
proﬁles generated by these two procedures coincide only when the proﬁles have equal means
(see Section 6, Proposition 6.1). This is illustrated in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 where we have
plotted the integrals of the cumulative and decumulative distribution functions of the proﬁles
of Example 3.1. A similar observation has to be made concerning the distinction between
generalised Lorenz dominance and reverse generalised Lorenz dominance. The ﬁrst criterion
requires that the quantile curves be integrated from 0 up to p and it declares that proﬁle x
generalised Lorenz dominates proﬁle y, which is written as x ≥GL y, if and only if
(3.7)
Z p
0
Q(ξ;x)dξ =
Z p
0
Q(ξ;y)dξ, ∀ p ∈ [0,1]
(see Shorrocks (1983)). As condition (c) of Theorem 3.2 makes clear, it is the reverse quantile
functions that have to be integrated from 0 up to p in the case of reverse generalised Lorenz
dominance. The generalised Lorenz curves and the reverse generalised Lorenz curves are
depicted respectively in Figures 3.3 and 3.4. We also note that, though a higher mean is
a necessary condition for second degree decumulative stochastic domination (see Section 6),
it is by no means suﬃcient as it can be easily veriﬁed. Indeed choose x4 = (3,3,7), x5 =
(1,5,6), which implies that µ(x4) = 13
3 > 12
3 = µ(x5). Inspection of Figure 3.5 indicates
that condition (b) of Theorem 3.2 does not hold. We know that by deﬁnition of generalised
Lorenz dominance, min{xi} = min{yi} is a necessary condition for x to generalised Lorenz –
or equivalently second degree stochastic – dominate y. It is not surprising that max{xi} =
max{yi} is necessary for x to be ranked above y by the reverse generalised Lorenz criterion.
Conditions (b) and (c) – and as a consequence condition (a) – above incorporate a concern for
Figure 3.5: Integrals of the decumulative distribution functions of x4 and x5
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more eﬃciently and less equally distributed individual endowments. Inequality reduction is
commonly associated in welfare economics with the Lorenz criterion or equivalently with the
11Stephen Bazen and Patrick Moyes/Elitism and Stochastic Dominance
concept of majorisation (see Marshall and Olkin (1979)). More precisely, given two proﬁles
x,y ∈ S(D) with n(x) = n(y) = n, we will say that proﬁle x Lorenz dominates proﬁle y,
which we write x ≥L y, if:
Z p
0
Q(ξ;x)dξ =
Z p
0
Q(ξ;y)dξ, ∀ p ∈ [0,1), and (3.8a)
µ(x) ≡
Z 1
0
Q(ξ;x)dξ =
Z 1
0
Q(ξ;y)dξ ≡ µ(y). (3.8b)
By deﬁnition, Lorenz domination of one distribution by another assumes that the distributions
have equal mean. As it is well-known, if distribution x is ranked above distribution y by the
Lorenz quasi-ordering, then y obtains from x by means of a ﬁnite sequence of regressive
transfers, and conversely. Then, we have the following remark that builds upon Marshall and
Olkin (1979, 5A9).
Figure 3.6: Reverse generalised Lorenz dominating and dominated proﬁles
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Remark 3.1. Let x,y ∈ S(D) with n(x) = n(y) and µ(x) = µ(y). Then, we have:
(3.9) x ≥V2 y ⇐⇒ ∃ z ∈ S(D) | z ≥L x and z ≥ y.
This clariﬁes the way eﬃciency and inequality contribute to the ranking of proﬁles when
unanimity is required to hold among all those making judgements and whose value functions
are non-decreasing and convex. 4 Incidently, it is a direct consequence of Remark 3.1 that,
if two proﬁles are ranked by the reverse generalised Lorenz criterion, then the dominating
proﬁle can be obtained from the dominated one by means of a ﬁnite sequence of increments
4 This has to be contrasted with standard second degree stochastic dominance where eﬃciency and equality
improvements result in higher ranked proﬁles.
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and/or regressive transfers. The diﬀerence between the generalised Lorenz and the reverse
generalised Lorenz criteria is best illustrated by means of a simple ﬁgure when there are
only two individuals. To this aim consider the proﬁle x6 = (2,5) identiﬁed with point X in
Figure 3.6. The shaded areas represent the sets of proﬁles that are dominated by and that
dominate x6 according to the reverse generalised quasi-ordering. The proﬁle x6 is dominated
by all the proﬁles located in the area LXJFCP, while it dominates all the proﬁles in the
area HXFBO. The area MXKP represents the proﬁles that vector dominate x6, while the
area NFGP represents those proﬁles that vector dominate the permutation of x6 (point F).
Therefore MXJFGP = MXKP ∪ NFGP consists of the proﬁles that are ranked above x6
by the reverse quantile quasi-ordering. All the points in the area LXM can be obtained
by means of an increment from a point located on the segment LX, which in turn results
from proﬁle x6 by a regressive transfer. It follows that all the proﬁles in the area LXM
are considered no worse than x6 by the reverse generalised Lorenz quasi-ordering. A similar
reasoning applies to the set FGC as compared to the permutation of x6 indicated by point F.
Since reverse quantile dominance implies reverse generalised Lorenz dominance, we conclude
that LXJFCP = LXM ∪ MXJFGP ∪ FGC. One would similar prove that HXFBO represents
the set of proﬁles that are reversed generalised Lorenz dominated by x6. For memory, all
the proﬁles in the area MXFGP generalised Lorenz dominate the proﬁle x6, which in turn
generalised Lorenz dominates all the proﬁles located in the area LXEFCO.
The convexity of the value function guarantees that a regressive transfer will always result
in an increase in performance. Now, we will take the argument one step further and claim that
the magnitude of the impact on performance of a regressive transfer depends on its location
on the attribute scale. It is not unreasonable to posit that a regressive transfer that takes
place among more endowed individuals has more impact on performance than a regressive
transfer of the same magnitude but taking place among less endowed individuals. This idea is
reminiscent of the notion of a diminishing progressive transfer introduced by Kolm (1976) and
subsequently generalised by Shorrocks and Foster (1987). Given two proﬁles x,y ∈ S(D) with
n(x) = n(y), we will say that proﬁle x is obtained from proﬁle y by means of a augmenting
regressive transfer if there exists ∆ > 0 and four individuals i, j, h and k with i < j < k and
i < h < k such that
xg = yg, ∀ h 6= i,j,h,k; (3.10a)
yi − xi = yj − xj = ∆; xi ≤ xj; (3.10b)
yh − xh = xk − yk = ∆; yh ≤ yk; (3.10c)
yj − xi = xk − yh = ξ; xi < yh. (3.10d)
An augmenting regressive transfer combines a progressive transfer in the lower part of the
distribution of endowments and a regressive transfer in the upper part of the distribution
with the additional requirements that the mean and the variance are not aﬀected. While it
is immediately clear that the mean is not modiﬁed by an augmenting regressive transfer, it is
also the case that the variance is unchanged as well. Consider any two proﬁles x and y such
that condition (3.10) holds. Then we have
n
h
σ
2(x) − σ
2(y)
i
=

x
2
i − y
2
i

+

x
2
j − y
2
j

+

x
2
h − y
2
h

+

x
2
k − y
2
k

= 2∆[(yk − yh) − (yj − yi)] + 4∆
2 = 0,
(3.11)
since yj − yi = yk − yh + 2∆. Suppose we agree that the overall impact on performance of
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such a transformation is positive in which case we must have Wv(x) = Wv(y) or equivalently:
(3.12) (v (yi) − v (xi)) − (v (xj) − v (yj)) 5 (v (xh) − v (yh)) − (v (yk) − v (xk)).
Upon manipulating and integrating, condition (3.12) reduces to
(3.13)
Z ∆
0
Z ξ
0
v
00 (xi + t + s) dtds 5
Z ∆
0
Z ξ
0
v
00 (yh + t + s) dtds,
which, since xi < yh, holds if v00(s) is non-decreasing with s. One can easily check that the
latter condition is also necessary for performance to increase as the result of an augmenting
regressive transfer. Suppose that v0 is not convex, in which case there exist s,t ∈ D with
s < t such that 2v0((s + t)/2) > v0(s)+v0(t). Choose x = (s+,(s + t)/2,(s + t)/2,t+) and
y = (s,((s + t)/2) + ,((s + t)/2) + ,t), so that x is obtained from y by means of a single
augmenting regressive transfer. Then, for  > 0 arbitrary small, we obtain
(3.14) v(s) + 2v
s + t
2
+ 

+ v(t) > v(s + ) + 2v
s + t
2

+ v(t + ),
hence Wv(y) > Wv(x). 5 For later reference we indicate by
(3.15) V3(D) := {v ∈ V (D) | v
0(s) = 0,v
00(s) = 0 and v
000(s) = 0, ∀ s}
the class of non-decreasing, convex with increasing second derivatives for value functions. Since
V3(D) is a proper subset of V2(D), the application of unanimity over the former class of value
functions will result in a ﬁner ranking than the one we get by imposing general agreement
among the latter class. The following result identiﬁes the procedure implementing unanimous
agreement for all value functions in the class V3(D).
Theorem 3.3. Let x,y ∈ S(D). Statements (a) and (b) below are equivalent:
(a) Wv(x) = Wv(y), for all v ∈ V3(D).
(b1) µ(x) = µ(y) and
(b2)
Z s
s
Z s
t
DF(u;x)dudt =
Z s
s
Z s
t
DF(u;y)dudt, for all s ∈ [s,s].
When statements (b1) and (b2) of Theorem 3.3 hold, we will say proﬁle x third order de-
cumulative stochastic dominates proﬁle y. We ﬁrst note that, contrary to what is the case
in Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, there exists no procedure based on the reverse quantile function
that permits to implement the unanimity of value judgements over the class V3(D). This is a
well-known result in the stochastic dominance literature, where the distribution function and
quantile function approaches only coincide for the ﬁrst and second orders.6 Integrating twice
from s to s the decumulative distribution functions and comparing the values obtained for all s
provide a practical means for checking if one proﬁle is unanimously preferred to another when
attention is restricted to value functions whose ﬁrst derivative is positive, non-decreasing and
5 Actually one only needs n = 3 in order to prove that v0 convex is necessary for performance to increase as
the result of an augmenting regressive transfer (see e.g. Moyes and Shorrocks (1994))
6 The dominance criteria based on the quantile functions are related to the dual model of choice under risk
introduced by Yaari (1987) and exploited later in the inequality literature by Ebert (1988), Yaari (1988) and
more recently by Chateauneuf and Moyes (2004, 2006) and Magdalou and Moyes (2009).
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Figure 3.7: Double integrals of the decumulative distribution functions of x7 and x8
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convex. Here again we would like to emphasise the distinction between standard cumulative
stochastic dominance and the notion of dominance used in the paper. Standard second degree
stochastic dominance requires that the cumulative distribution functions are integrated from
s up to s. In our case, as in second order decumulative stochastic dominance, the double inte-
grals are evaluated from t and s up to the upper bound s. In general third order decumulative
stochastic dominance and third order standard stochastic dominance lead to diﬀerent rank-
ings of proﬁles in terms of performance. The only case where the two procedures generates
the same rankings is when the proﬁles under comparison have equal means and variance (see
Section 6, Proposition 6.2). Finally, we note that it is necessary for proﬁle x to third degree
decumulative stochastic dominate proﬁle y that
(3.16) (µ(x) − s)
2 + σ
2(x) = (µ(y) − s)
2 + σ
2(y)
(see Section 6). In particular, this implies that, if the proﬁles x and y have the same mean,
then the variance of x is no smaller than the variance of y. That this condition is not suﬃcient
is easily established by considering the proﬁles x7 = (4,8,12,12) and x8 = (6,6,10,13). Then,
we have µ(x7) = 9 > 8.75 = µ(x8) and σ2(x7) = 11 > 8.69 = σ2(x8), hence condition (3.16)
holds. However, the double integrals of the decumulative distribution functions of x7 and x8
cross as Figure 3.7 indicates and x7 does not dominate x8.
Admittedly, Theorem 3.3 is silent about the transformations of the proﬁles that underlie
second degree decumulative stochastic dominance. That increments, regressive transfers and
augmenting regressive transfers imply second degree decumulative stochastic domination of one
proﬁle over another follows directly from the deﬁnitions and Theorem 3.3. That the converse
implication holds – if one proﬁle second degree decumulative stochastically dominates another,
then it can be obtained from the latter by means of a ﬁnite sequence of increments, regressive
transfers and/or augmenting regressive transfers – follows from Shorrocks and Foster (1987).
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4. Two Illustrations of the Measurement of Elitism
4.1. Aﬄuence Versus Poverty
In order to contrast aﬄuence and poverty we have applied the generalised Lorenz and the
reverse generalised Lorenz criteria to the comparison of 17 countries using income data from
the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). For each household, the LIS database indicates the dis-
posable household income (DHI), that is its total income after taxation and transfer payments,
and the household type determined by its composition and size. Incomes are provided in local
currencies in order to facilitate comparisons within a country over time. These ﬁgures have
been converted using the purchasing power parities (PPP) proposed by the OECD in order to
make them comparable across countries. To take family needs into account it is necessary to
adjust household incomes for size and for each household in the sample we have computed its
equivalent income. Assuming independence of base level (see Blundell and Lewbel (1991)), the
equivalent income of a household with income y and size m is given by E(y;m) = y/K(m), for
all m ≥ 1 and all y ∈ D, where K(m) is the (relative) equivalence scale. Following Atkinson,
Rainwater, and Smeeding (1995), we have chosen the isoelastic equivalence scale K(m) = mρ
with ρ = .5. 7 Table 4.1 gives the list of countries we have retained and indicates for each of
Table 4.1: The countries under comparison
No Country Year Sample Size Mean DHI Std Dev Minimum Maximum
1 Hungary 1999 1 927 6 434.90 4 262.95 1 303.17 21 928.93
2 Mexico 2000 10 072 6 455.17 8 311.57 360.83 39 031.63
3 Poland 1999 30 812 7 157.41 4 432.45 1 474.71 22 828.70
4 Greece 2000 3 873 14 759.51 10 045.33 2 063.03 48 390.47
5 Netherlands 1999 4 331 19 100.21 9 124.06 1 381.17 47 538.52
6 Spain 2000 4 761 18 972.04 13 570.97 2 244.69 66 521.03
7 Germany 2000 10 982 20 452.42 10 401.80 3 771.69 53 899.97
8 Austria 2000 2 329 22 146.59 11 396.56 3 706.64 60 142.81
9 Sweden 2000 14 471 18 984.00 9 087.55 3 485.15 48 608.26
10 Canada 2000 28 902 24 702.29 14 499.66 3 800.81 72 485.77
11 Luxembourg 2000 2 415 30 746.20 15 704.40 10 017.84 80 973.26
12 Switzerland 2000 3 627 26 803.70 14 695.83 4 805.17 76 118.33
13 USA 2000 49 294 31 638.14 26 909.75 2 640.00 132 770.50
14 United Kingdom 1999 24 830 22 169.08 15 655.46 3 886.12 76 609.44
15 Belgium 2000 2 080 21 266.58 11 638.94 5 010.52 60 948.45
16 Norway 2000 12 870 25 190.53 12 745.74 4 965.74 70 526.72
17 Finland 2000 10 419 18 816.83 9 394.95 5 527.89 51 034.15
these the year when the data were collected, the number of households in the sample, the mean
of the corresponding adjusted DHIs, the standard deviation, and the minimum and maximum
incomes.
The approaches in terms of poverty and aﬄuence coincide at the ﬁrst degree since they
both imply that the value function is non-decreasing. This is no longer true for second and
third degree dominance where aﬄuence and poverty impose that the value function satisﬁes
conﬂicting conditions. Concerning the second degree, we know from the deﬁnitions that, if
7 While isoelastic equivalence scales are very speciﬁc and impose strong restrictions on the household’s be-
haviour and on its members’ preferences as shown by Ebert and Moyes (2011), they nevertheless pro-
vide rather good approximations of the scales currently used in empirical work (see Buhmann, Rainwater,
Schmaus, and Smeeding (1988)).
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one country is ranked above another by the quantile quasi-ordering, then so it is according
to the generalised Lorenz and the reverse generalised Lorenz quasi-orderings. Therefore, for a
comparison of generalised Lorenz and reverse generalised Lorenz dominances to be meaningful,
we have to restrict attention to those pairs of countries that are not ranked by the quantile
criterion. Application of the generalised Lorenz quasi-ordering and of the reverse generalised
Lorenz quasi-ordering to these 42 pairs of countries gives the results summarised in Table
4.2. We ﬁrst note that together the generalised Lorenz and the reverse generalised Lorenz
criteria allow to rank 38 pairs of countries out of the 42 for which the quantile criterion is not
decisive. More important for our purpose is the fact that the generalised Lorenz and the reverse
generalised Lorenz criteria give opposite conclusions with only one exception – Germany and
Belgium – where they both agree. The reverse generalised Lorenz criterion appears to be more
decisive than the generalised Lorenz criterion as 26 pairs of countries can be ranked by the
former while the latter gives conclusive verdicts in only 12 cases. As the reverse generalised
Figure 4.1: Reverse quantile curves of Belgium and Germany
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Lorenz dominance criterion favours both eﬃciency – a larger mean income is better – and
inequality – a more unequal sharing of national income is better – the fact that it is more
discriminatory for ranking countries is symptomatic of the fact that countries with larger per
capita income tend to be also those where it is more unequally shared. To sum up, poverty
and aﬄuence do not appear to be two sides of the same coin – more aﬄuence is not equivalent
to less poverty – but are rather distinct features of the distributions. This is reﬂected in
the deﬁnition of the criteria where partial sums are computed starting from low incomes to
higher incomes in the case of the generalised Lorenz quasi-ordering whereas for the reverse
generalised Lorenz quasi-ordering it is the contrary. The poorest individuals play a crucial
role for generalised Lorenz dominance as a distribution cannot be ranked above another one if
they have less income in the former distribution than in the latter. Similarly, for dominance in
terms of reverse generalised Lorenz dominance it is necessary that the richest individuals do not
experience a loss of income. The one case where both criteria agree is particularly interesting
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as it suggests that the dominating distribution is more polarised than the dominated one:
there is relatively more aﬄuence and less poverty in Belgium than in Germany. 8 Inspection
of Figure 4.1 reveals that the reverse quantile curve of Belgium intersects twice the reverse
quantile curve of Germany ﬁrst from above.
Three countries – the Netherlands, Sweden and Finland – cannot be compared by the gen-
eralised Lorenz and the reverse generalised Lorenz criteria. Inspection of Table 4.1 suggests
that Finland might be ranked above Sweden which in turn might be ranked above the Nether-
lands when comparisons are made on the basis of third order – cumulative and decumulative –
stochastic dominance. Indeed, Finland has higher mean, minimal and maximal incomes than
Sweden and the same is true for Sweden as compared to the Netherlands. However, for each
of these three pairs of countries, either the double integrals of the cumulative distribution
functions, or the double integrals of the survival functions, intersect at least once. Therefore,
the recourse to the third order stochastic dominance tests does not help to resolve these cases
of non-comparability.
4.2. Scientiﬁc Performance
In a second application, we use data derived from the Journal of Economic Literature (JEL)
contents of journals for the period 1991 to 2000. These data were used in Lubrano et al. (2003)
(see also Lubrano and Protopopescu (2004)) and were kindly provided by Michel Lubrano.
For each publishing author in economics departments and economics research institutes in
Europe, Lubrano et al. (2003) calculated an author score using the number of publications
in ﬁve groups of journals. An article in a top journal is awarded ﬁve points and so on down
to one point for the lowest quality journal referenced in the JEL. The scores recorded are for
the ten year period 1991-2000. On the basis of these scores, Lubrano et al. (2003) construct
an index to establish a ranking of economics departments, the ﬁrst 20 of which are presented
in Table 4.3. 9 The ﬁrst column indicates for each department its ranking in Lubrano et al.
(2003)’s study while columns 3 to 6 provide some descriptive statistics. The London School of
Economics is ﬁrst followed by Tilburg and the Oxbridge departments. Within the countries
covered, a disproportionate number of UK departments ﬁgure in the top 20 departments. We
ﬁrst note that the departments under consideration are of very unequal sizes ranging from
around 300 aﬃliations for Cambridge, Oxford and the London School of Economics to less
than 80 for Essex. The standard deviations of the three departments with the highest mean
scores (Tilburg, Toulouse, Essex) are very diﬀerent. Toulouse in particular has a high standard
deviation which suggests that its high mean performance has probably to be imputed to a few
academics. On the other hand, relatively low mean scores are generally associated with low
values of the standard deviation (Bonn, Maastricht, Stockholm University, Warwick, Oxford,
London Business School) which is an indication of a more equal distribution of the publication
scores within the department.
8 Such a situation is not exceptional as it can be checked by means of a simple example. Consider two income
distributions x = (1.5,1.5,3.5) and y = (1,2,3) that are not comparable by means of the quantile criterion.
One veriﬁes that x dominates y according to both the generalised Lorenz and the reverse generalised Lorenz
criteria. Actually, x can be obtained from y ﬁrst by increasing the income of individual 1 by an amount 0.5
and then by transferring an amount 0.5 from individual 3 to individual 2. But y can also be transformed
into x by means of an increment aﬀecting individual 3 followed by a regressive transfer involving individuals
1 and 2.
9 We were unable to reconstitute four of the departments ranked by Lubrano et al. (2003) which were aggregates
of diﬀerent research institutes.
19Stephen Bazen and Patrick Moyes/Elitism and Stochastic Dominance
Table 4.3: The economic departments under comparison
Rank Department Affiliations Mean Std Dev Maximum
1 London School of Economics (LSE) 334 12.77 21.80 180
2 Tilburg 209 18.59 28.50 226
3 Oxford 338 9.72 17.80 165
4 Cambridge 290 10.74 18.90 227
5 Erasmus 256 11.11 21.49 253
6 Louvain 148 15.35 28.70 226
7 Amsterdam 177 14.42 23.40 167
8 Warwick 196 12.33 19.60 123
9 Toulouse 115 18.85 43.30 267
10 University College London (UCL) 176 17.73 31.10 212
11 Nottingham 118 16.31 26.40 171
12 York 132 12.40 18.70 94
13 Stockholm School of Economics (SSE) 123 14.77 23.20 151
14 Maastricht 145 12.78 19.40 120
15 Essex 77 19.18 28.90 131
16 Universitat Autonoma Barcelona (UAB) 113 13.34 20.50 105
17 Stockholm University (SU) 106 11.97 22.10 154
18 Bonn 96 12.32 18.80 132
19 London Business School (LBS) 97 13.06 17.30 85
20 Free University Amsterdam (FUA) 130 12.32 23.60 167
Given the explicitly normative basis for ranking departments in terms of performance
set out above, it will be interesting to see if a similar ranking is obtained when we apply
our criteria. Since the latter are based on decumulative stochastic dominance, the number
and direction of potential rankings can be reduced by looking ﬁrst at the maximum score in a
department. For example, since the maximum score is obtained by a member of the economics
department at the University of Toulouse, this university cannot be ranked below any other
in the list on the basis of the dominance criteria proposed above. Secondly, the average
score of a department that is ranked above another by ﬁrst order decumulative stochastic
dominance cannot be lower. For instance, the fact that Louvain has a lower mean score
than University College London prevents Louvain from being ranked above University College
of London by ﬁrst order stochastic dominance, even though the maximum score is higher for
Louvain. Furthermore, the integral of the survival function over the range is equal to the mean
score, so that a higher mean score is also a necessary condition for second order dominance as
well. The economics department at the University of Essex has the highest mean score in our
sample, and thus cannot be dominated by other departments. Therefore, Table 4.3 also deﬁnes
the subset of potential dominance relations out of the 190 possible pairwise comparisons.
Application of ﬁrst order and second order decumulative stochastic dominance to our 20
economics departments allows us to rank 89 pairs of departments among the 190 possible pairs
which amounts to a success rate of about 47%. Our results are summarised in Table 4.4 where
the departments are listed according to the ranking of Lubrano et al. (2003). Surprisingly, ﬁrst
order decumulative stochastic dominance gives a conclusive verdict in 14 cases out of 190: for
those pairs, whatever the threshold, the proportion of aﬃliated academics whose publication
scores exceed this threshold value is greater in one department than in the other. From this
point of view the cases of Tilburg, University College London, Nottingham and to a lesser
extent Essex are worth noting: Tilburg dominates Oxford, Warwick, York, Maastricht and
Universitat Autonoma Barcelona, University College London dominates the London School
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of Economics, Oxford, Warwick and Maastricht, Nottingham dominates Oxford and York,
while Essex dominates Universitat Autonoma Barcelona, and none of these four departments
appears to be dominated by another department at the ﬁrst order.
Moving from ﬁrst to second order decumulative stochastic dominance allows us to obtain
conclusive verdicts in a further 75 cases (see Table 4.4). 10 This is a relatively large number of
rankings – nearly half of the maximum possible – for this type of approach (see for example
the comparisons of income distributions above). Therefore, the introduction of the concern for
elitism – captured by the convexity of the value function – enables a signiﬁcant reduction in
the number of inconclusive cases. The most important conclusion is that Toulouse dominates
all the other departments with the exception of Essex. The reason why Toulouse does not rank
above other departments at the ﬁrst order is because the academics with the lowest scores in
Toulouse do worse than the academics with the lowest scores in these departments. This is
partly reﬂected by the fact that Toulouse has the largest variance in the publication scores.
A second group of departments – dominated by Toulouse but not by Essex – are Tilburg,
University College London and Louvain. On the basis of the transitive property of stochastic
dominance relations, these three universities dominate the Free University of Amsterdam and
Amsterdam, and the latter dominates the London School of Economics and the Stockholm
School of Economics. Since the latter also dominates Warwick, York, Maastricht, Universitat
Autonoma Barcelona, Bonn and the London Business School, so do all departments that
dominate the Stockholm School of Economics (the three mentioned plus Amsterdam and
Nottingham). It should be noted that it is not possible to rank Tilburg, the University
College London and Louvain above Essex, Cambridge and Erasmus, and Louvain does not
rank above Nottingham. The cases of Cambridge, Essex and Erasmus are worth mentioning:
they cannot be ranked below the highest placed departments, but they do not rank above many
lower-placed departments either. Erasmus only dominates Oxford and Cambridge, Essex only
dominates Warwick and York, and Cambridge cannot be ranked above any department.
In order to verify how much at variance with the standard stochastic dominance approach
the concept of elitism is, we have applied the generalised Lorenz criterion to our sample of
economics departments (see Table A.1). We get a conclusive verdict for 72 pairs of depart-
ments out of the 176 pairs for which (reverse) quantile dominance is non-decisive. Contrary
to what happened in our ﬁrst illustration, application of generalised Lorenz dominance pro-
duces a score comparable with that obtained with the reverse generalised Lorenz dominance
approach. A ﬁrst consequence is that the application of generalised Lorenz dominance enables
a number of indeterminacies obtained by the quantile criterion to be removed: both University
College London and Nottingham dominate Cambridge, Erasmus and Louvain. Similarly, the
Stockholm School of Economics and Maastricht dominate Oxford, Cambridge and Erasmus
who are also dominated by Stockholm University, Bonn and the London Business School.
Among the most interesting features that emerge as the result of the application of the stan-
dard generalised Lorenz criterion, we note that Essex, that was not comparable to Toulouse
by reverse generalised Lorenz dominance, is now ranked above Toulouse by the generalised
10Admittedly, the attribute whose distribution is the object of comparisons is at best a very crude proxy of
an academic’s scientiﬁc performance. One way to acknowledge this imprecision would be to interpret an
academic’s publication score as an ordinal measure of her scientiﬁc performance, in which case moving from
ﬁrst degree stochastic dominance to second degree dominance will make little sense. Indeed, the resulting
ranking of institutions would not be robust to increasing transformations of the individual performance
scale. While we are aware of this diﬃculty, we nevertheless believe that this exercise might shed light on
some important features of the academic landscape in Europe.
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Lorenz criterion. Actually, Essex is never dominated because it has the highest mean publica-
tion score, yet itself only dominates a few departments: in addition to dominating Toulouse
by the standard generalised Lorenz criterion, Essex only dominates Warwick, the Stockholm
School of Economics, Maastricht and the London Business School by the reversed generalised
Lorenz criterion, and, as we already noted, Universitat Autonoma Barcelona by the quantile
criterion. The cases of Tilburg and University College London are also worth noting: both
dominate all the other departments – with the exceptions of University College London and
Essex for Tilburg and Essex for University College London – by either the (reverse) quan-
tile criterion, or the generalised Lorenz criterion, or the reverse generalised Lorenz criterion
(see Table A.2). At the other extreme, the Oxford appears to be dominated at the second
order by all departments with the exception of Warwick, York, Essex and Universitat Au-
tonoma Barcelona. Things are less clearcut for Cambridge which is ranked above Oxford by
the generalised Lorenz criterion and cannot be compared with Louvain, Warwick, York, Es-
sex, Universitat Autonoma Barcelona and the Free University of Amsterdam at the second
order. All together the generalised Lorenz and the reverse generalised Lorenz criteria lead to
a conclusive verdict in 105 cases where the (reverse) quantile criterion was not decisive. The
applications of generalised Lorenz and reverse generalised Lorenz dominance criteria provide
contrasting pictures and suggest that economics departments have pursued diﬀerent strate-
gies. On the one hand, Toulouse has an elitist strategy with a relatively small group of top
publishing academics but with also a fraction of the staﬀ with considerably lower publication
records. On the other hand, Essex has deﬁnitively a less elitist strategy and seems rather to
look for a more homogenous staﬀ in terms of publication scores.
It remains to be seen whether things improve when one applies third order decumulative
stochastic dominance for comparing the economics departments. A look at Table 4.3 already
makes clear that a number of departments will not pass the test. Consider for instance the
13 departments that second order decumulative stochastic dominance fails to compare with
the London School of Economics. Clearly, Cambridge, Erasmus and York cannot be ranked
above the London School of Economics by third order decumulative stochastic dominance since
they have lower means and variances. Does it mean that Cambridge, Erasmus and York are
dominated at the third order by the London School of Economics? Actually, the double integral
of the decumulative distribution function of any of these departments intersects that of the
London School of Economics. Condition (b2) of Theorem 3.3 is not fulﬁlled and it is therefore
impossible to obtain a decisive verdict on the basis of third order decumulative stochastic
dominance. Similarly, because the mean scores and the variances of Amsterdam, Nottingham,
the Stockholm School of Economics and Essex are greater than those of the London School of
Economics, it is possible for the former departments to dominate the latter. But here again
comparison of the double integrals of the decumulative distribution functions of Amsterdam,
Nottingham, the Stockholm School of Economics and Essex with that of the London School of
Economics does not allow one arrive at conclusive verdicts. Actually similar conclusions hold
for all pairs of departments that are not ranked by the second order decumulative stochastic
dominance criterion and the application of third order decumulative stochastic dominance
leads deﬁnitively to non-comparabilities.
5. Concluding Remarks
Up to now stochastic dominance has been used in comparisons of risky projects and of income
distributions with emphasis placed on preferring distributions with more equality with par-
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ticular attention placed on what happens in the lower half of the distribution. The approach
set out in this article suggests a further domain of application of stochastic dominance tech-
niques. When elitism is important in a society or an institution, then performance rather than
equality becomes the objective. Interest is concentrated more on what happens in the upper
tail of the distribution. This position militates in favour of a convex utility function – or as
we call it a value function – a condition whose implications for stochastic dominance had not
been fully explored (see however Wong and Li (1999), Fishburn (1974) and Ross (1983)). 11
The modiﬁed stochastic dominance criteria proposed here are useful for comparing distribu-
tions of incomes when aﬄuence is society’s objective and when comparing the scientiﬁc output
of diﬀerent research institutes or departments. The paper identiﬁes the dominance tests to
be implemented in order to decide whether one distribution is ranked above another by all
utilitarian performance functions whose value functions are non-decreasing and convex. This
demonstrates the ﬂexibility and potential applicability of the stochastic dominance approach,
that goes far beyond its traditional use in risk and welfare theories.
However, the approach expounded here is not without its limits. As a practical tool for
making comparisons of distributions, the stochastic dominance approach produces a partial
rather than a complete ranking of distributions. Part of the incompleteness of the ranking
obtained is inherently linked to the necessary conditions for dominance such as the maximum
income or publication score. This is the price paid for comparisons based on clearly speciﬁed
value judgments rather than on an index which may be built on implicit and unstated norma-
tive criteria. However, nothing prevents us from considering the dominance tests introduced
in this paper as a ﬁrst round approach which may be supplemented in a second stage by
the use of cardinal indices leading to a complete ordering of the proﬁles under comparison.
For instance, using (2.5) and choosing speciﬁc forms for the value function would produce
particular summary indices that could be used to resolve the incompleteness inherent in the
dominance approach. In particular, letting v(s) = s1−η/(1 − η) with η 5 0 would generate a
family of indices analogous to the Atkinson-Kolm-Sen (AKS) family of evaluation functions.
When η = 0, we obtain Ξv(x) = µ(x), while Ξv(x) = max{xi} when η = −∞. Whatever the
value of η, these indices will be monotone increasing: performance improves as the result of
increments. For regressive transfers to increase performance as measured by such indices we
have to restrict η to be non-negative, while η 5 −1 guarantees that augmenting regressive
transfers have a positive impact on performance. 12 The results extend to the generalised ex-
pected utility model of Quiggin (1993), that oﬀers more ﬂexibility than the standard expected
utility model. This might be interesting as it allows the possibility to use diﬀerent cardinal
measures of performance like modiﬁcations of the Gini index.
A second weakness of our approach arises from the fact that the score variable aggregates
diﬀerent dimensions that all contribute to the performance of an institution. The evaluation of
the research performance has given rise to widespread debates among the scientiﬁc community
concerning in particular the appropriateness of the variables to be used. The choice of one
variable among many others would not be that crucial if all the variables of potential interest
appear to be correlated. However, there is evidence that the ranking of institutions varies
11To be more precise, it is the consequences of imposing increasingness and convexity on the utility function,
that have not been investigated to the best of our knowledge. Notable exceptions are Makdissi and Wodon
(2004) who applied criteria similar to ours to the measurement of the depletion rate of a natural resource,
and Riese and Brunner (1998) who examine the severity of unemployment in terms of the spell lengths.
12These properties follow from Ebert (1988) who among other things provides a characterisation of the AKS
family.
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with the choice of the variable retained for valuing publications. The evaluation of scientiﬁc
performance involves at least two criteria that may not be correlated: quantity as measured for
instance by the number of pages or articles published and quality approximated by the ranking
of the journal where the article appeared. The latter can be determined by number of citations
received by the journal or by its impact factors, or it can be derived from a general consensus
among the profession. The way the scores are computed imposes arbitrary trade-oﬀs between
the diﬀerent variables that are deemed relevant when assessing performance. Aggregating these
dimensions into a single index as we did in Section 4.2 – where each academic is endowed with
the number of articles he or she published multiplied by a variable measuring the quality of
the journals – is not very informative. Indeed, two departments may rank closely even though
they have adopted opposite publication strategies. For example, one department may have a
high score based on the quantity of publications but these are concentrated in less prestigious
journals, while another may have smaller quantitative output but concentrated in the top
journals. A multidimensional approach building upon and extending the criteria devised in
the inequality literature (see e.g. Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987), Bourguignon (1989),
Bazen and Moyes (2003) or Gravel and Moyes (2008)) would overcome this drawback and
seems more appropriate.
Finally, the normative nature of the stochastic dominance approach means that the axioms
upon which the criteria for comparison are based may not be universally accepted: there are
no right or wrong axioms. In particular, the relevance of the convexity of the value function,
which captures the performance-improving nature of a regressive transfer, may be questioned.
Clearly this form is relevant only in cases where it is accepted that society or an institution may
beneﬁt from greater inequality. An economic model which justiﬁes the convexity of the value
function may be useful in this context – for example, a model of the allocation of time between
teaching and research in an economics department or a model of educational investment in a
developing economy.
6. Technicalities and Proofs
The fact that we are working within a discrete framework imposes a particular structure that
one should keep in mind throughout. In particular, it will be important in a later stage when
the dominance criteria will be implemented. For the sake of interpretation, it may be helpful
temporarily to conceive of the proﬁle x := (x1,...,xn(x)) as an income distribution. Then we
have
F(s;x) =
q(s;x)
n(x)
= P1(s;x) and (6.1a)
1 − F(s;x) =
r(s;x)
n(x)
= R1(s;x), (6.1b)
where by deﬁnition
q(s;x) := #{i ∈ {1,2,...,n(x)} | xi 5 s} and (6.2a)
r(s;x) := #{i ∈ {1,2,...,n(x)} | xi > s} (6.2b)
are respectively the number of poor and rich individuals in situation x when the poverty line is
set equal to s. The quantity P1(s;x) represents the percentage of individuals who in situation
x are not above the poverty line s. Symmetrically, R1(s;x) is the percentage of individuals
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in situation x above the poverty line s and it may be interpreted as a measure of aﬄuence in
the society. Integrating F(s;x) and 1 − F(s;x), we obtain
Z s
s
F(t;x)dt =
1
n(x)
q(s;x) X
i=1
(s − xi) = P2(s;x) and (6.3a)
Z s
s
(1 − F(t;x))dt =
1
n(x)
n(x) X
i=r(s;x)
(xi − s) = R2(s;x). (6.3b)
The quantity P2(s;x) is the so-called average poverty gap, which represents the income needed
in order to alleviate poverty deﬂated by the population size. Symmetrically, R2(s;x) is the
average income in excess to the poverty line, which we would be inclined to interpret as a
measure of average aﬄuence: throwing away this amount of income has no impact on poverty.
Integrating again, we get
Z s
s
Z t
s
F(u;x)dudt =
1
n(x)2
q(s;x) X
i=1
(s − xi)
2 = P3(s;x) and (6.4a)
Z s
s
Z s
t
(1 − F(u;x))dudt =
1
n(x)2
n(x) X
i=r(s;x)
(xi − s)
2 = R3(s;x). (6.4b)
To simplify the notation we let F(s) = F(s;x) and G(s) = F(s;y) represent the cdfs of
distributions (or proﬁles) x and y. The ddfs of x and y are therefore given by 1 − F(s) and
1−G(s), respectively. Similarly, we indicate by f(s) = f(s;x) and g(s) = g(s;y) their density
functions. Since by deﬁnition the utilitarian rule is invariant with respect to a replication – in
other words it veriﬁes the principle of population (see Dalton (1920)) – we assume without loss
of generality that the proﬁles x and y have the same dimension: hence n(x) = n(y) = n = 2.
Before we turn to the proofs of Theorems 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 we ﬁnd it useful to establish a
number of facts.
Mean. By deﬁnition of the mean, we have
(6.5) µ(F) =
Z s
s
sf(s)ds = s −
Z s
s
F(s)ds,
from which we get
(6.6)
Z s
s
F(s)ds = s − µ(F).
Integrating 1 − F(s) over [s,s] , we get:
(6.7)
Z s
s
(1 − F(s))ds = (s − s) −
Z s
s
F(s)ds,
which, upon using (6.6), reduces to
(6.8)
Z s
s
(1 − F(s))ds = µ(F) − s.
Combining (6.6) and (6.8), we obtain
(6.9) µ(F) = s −
Z s
s
F(s)ds = s +
Z s
s
(1 − F(s))ds.
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Second Order Stochastic Dominances. Assume that F is second degree stochastically
dominated by G so that
(6.10)
Z s
s
h
F(t) − G(t)
i
dt = 0, ∀ s ∈ [s,s].
Suppose now that µ(F) = µ(G), which, upon using (6.9), is equivalent to
(6.11)
Z s
s
h
F(s) − G(s)
i
ds =
Z s
s
h
(1 − F(s)) − (1 − G(s))
i
ds = 0.
This implies that
(6.12)
Z s
s
h
(1 − F(t)) − (1 − G(t))
i
dt +
Z s
s
h
(1 − F(t)) − (1 − G(t))
i
dt = 0,
which can be rewritten as
(6.13)
Z s
s
h
G(t) − F(t)
i
dt +
Z s
s
h
(1 − F(t)) − (1 − G(t))
i
dt = 0,
and holds for all s ∈ [s,s]. It follows from (6.10) that the ﬁrst term of (6.13) is less or equal
to zero and we therefore deduce that
(6.14)
Z s
s
h
(1 − F(t)) − (1 − G(t))
i
dt = 0, ∀ s ∈ [s,s].
The argument works the other way round and we conclude (see also Shaked and Shanthikumar
(1994, p. 56)):
Proposition 6.1. If F and G have equal means, then F is second order stochastically domi-
nated by G in the usual sense if and only if F second order stochastically dominates G in the
survival sense.
Variance. By deﬁnition of the variance we have
(6.15) σ
2(F) = s
2 − µ(F)
2 − 2
Z s
s
sF(s)ds.
Integrating by parts the last integral in (6.15), we obtain
(6.16) σ
2(F) = s
2 − µ(F)
2 − 2s
Z s
s
F(s)ds + 2
Z s
s
Z s
s
F(t)dtds.
Using (6.6) and upon substitution into (6.16), we get
(6.17) σ
2(F) = −(s − µ(F))
2 + 2
Z s
s
Z s
s
F(t)dtds,
from which we deduce that
(6.18)
Z s
s
Z s
s
F(t)dtds =
(s − µ(F))
2 + σ2(F)
2
.
Third Order Stochastic Dominances. Assume that F is third degree stochastically
dominated by G so that
(6.19)
Z s
s
Z t
s
h
F(u) − G(u)
i
dudt = 0, ∀ s ∈ [s,s].
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Suppose now that µ(F) = µ(G) and σ2(F) = σ2(G), which upon using (6.18) is equivalent to
(6.20)
Z s
s
Z t
s
h
F(u) − G(u)
i
dudt =
Z s
s
Z t
s
h
(1 − F(u)) − (1 − G(u))
i
dudt = 0.
This implies that
(6.21)
Z s
s
Z t
s
h
(1 − F(u)) − (1 − G(u))
i
dudt +
Z s
s
Z t
s
h
(1 − F(u)) − (1 − G(u))
i
dudt = 0,
which can be rewritten as
(6.22)
Z s
s
Z t
s
h
G(u) − F(u)
i
dudt +
Z s
s
Z t
s
h
(1 − F(u)) − (1 − G(u))
i
dudt = 0,
and holds for all s ∈ [s,s]. It follows from (6.19) that the ﬁrst term of (6.22) is less or equal
to zero and we therefore deduce that
(6.23)
Z s
s
Z t
s
h
(1 − F(u)) − (1 − G(u))
i
dudt = 0,
which holds true for all s ∈ [s,s]. The argument works the other way round and we conclude:
Proposition 6.2. If F and G have equal means and variances, then F is third order stochas-
tically dominated by G in the usual sense if and only if F third order stochastically dominates
G in the survival sense.
We are now well equipped and can proceed to the proofs of Theorems 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3
successively.
Theorem 3.1. It is obvious from the deﬁnitions that the ranking of proﬁles implied by
the ﬁrst order decumulative stochastic dominance criterion is identical to that generated by
standard ﬁrst order stochastic dominance. Similarly, the rankings of proﬁles resulting from the
application of the quantile dominance criterion and the reverse quantile dominance criterion
are identical. We therefore refer the reader to the standard proofs in the stochastic dominance
literature (see e.g. Saposnik (1981), Fishburn and Vickson (1978)).
Theorem 3.2. We prove successively the following two chains of implications: (c) =⇒ (a) =⇒
(c) and (b) =⇒ (a) =⇒ (b).
(c) =⇒ (a). We have to show that, if condition (b) holds, then
(6.24) Wv(x) − Wv(y) =
1
n
n X
i=1
v (xi) − v (yi)
xi − yi
[xi − yi] = 0,
for all v ∈ V2(D). Applying Abel’s decomposition rule to (6.24), we obtain
Wv(x) − Wv(y) =
v (x1) − v (y1)
x1 − y1
1
n
n X
h=1
[xh − yh]
+
n X
i=2
 
v (xi) − v (yi)
xi − yi
−
v (xi−1) − v (xi−1)
xi−1 − yi−1
!
1
n
n X
h=i
[xh − yh] = 0.
(6.25)
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The ﬁrst fraction on the rhs of (6.25) is non-negative because v is non-decreasing. It can be
shown that the convexity of v guarantees that the diﬀerence of fractions within large brackets
on the rhs of (6.25) is also non-negative. We therefore conclude that
(6.26)
1
n
n X
h=i
xh =
1
n
n X
h=i
yh, ∀ i = 1,2,...,n,
is a suﬃcient condition for (6.24) to hold.
(a) =⇒ (c). We argue a contrario and show that, if condition (c) does not hold, then nor does
condition (a). Let k∗ be the smallest k such that xn + xn−1 + ··· + xk+1 + xk < yn + yn−1 +
··· + yk+1 + yk, which implies that xk∗ < yk∗. Choosing
(6.27) v(s) :=



0, for s ≤ xk∗,
s − xk∗, for xk∗ < s,
which is non-decreasing and convex, we obtain
(6.28)
n X
i=1
v
∗ (yi) = yn + ··· + yk∗+1 + yk∗ > xn + ··· + xk∗+1 + xk∗ =
n X
i=1
v
∗ (xi).
The proof is made complete by noting that v∗ can be approximated as closely as desired by a
diﬀerentiable non-decreasing and convex function.
(b) =⇒ (a). We have to show that, if condition (b) holds, then
(6.29) Wv(x) − Wv(y) =
Z s
s
v(s)
h
f(s) − g(s)
i
ds = 0,
for all v ∈ V2(D). Upon integrating by parts (6.29) twice and using the fact that F (s) =
G(s) = 1, this reduces to
(6.30) −v
0(s)
Z s
s
h
F(s) − G(s)
i
ds +
Z s
s
v
00(s)
Z s
s
h
F(t) − G(t)
i
dtds = 0,
which we can rewrite equivalently as
(6.31) v
0(s)
Z s
s
h
(1−F(s))−(1−G(s))
i
ds−
Z s
s
v
00(s)
Z s
s
h
(1−F(t))−(1−G(t))
i
dtds = 0.
Using (6.4), the fact that
Z s
s
h
(1 − F(t)) − (1 − G(t))
i
dt =
Z s
s
h
(1 − F(t)) − (1 − G(t))
i
dt
−
Z s
s
h
(1 − F(t))−(1 − G(t))
i
dt,
(6.32)
for all s ∈ [s,s], and upon substituting into (6.31), we obtain
(6.33) v
0(s)
h
µ(F)−µ(G)
i
−
Z s
s
v
00(s)
"
µ(F) − µ(G) −
Z s
s
h
(1 − F(t)) − (1 − G(t))
i
dt
#
ds = 0,
or equivalently
(6.34)

µ(F) − µ(G)

"
v
0(s) −
Z s
s
v
00(s)ds
#
+
Z s
s
h
(1 − F(t)) − (1 − G(t))
i
dtds = 0,
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which ﬁnally simpliﬁes to
(6.35) v
0(s)
h
µ(F) − µ(G)
i
+
Z s
s
v
00(s)
Z s
s
h
(1 − F(t)) − (1 − G(t))
i
dtds = 0.
Using (6.8) and upon substitution into the ﬁrst term of (6.35), we ﬁnally obtain
(6.36) v
0(s)
Z s
s
h
(1 − F(t)) − (1 − G(t))
i
dt +
Z s
s
v
00(s)
Z s
s
h
(1 − F(t)) − (1 − G(t))
i
dtds = 0.
Since by assumption v0(s) = 0 and v00(s) = 0, for all s ∈ (s,s), we conclude that
(6.37)
Z s
s
(1 − F(t))dt =
Z s
s
(1 − G(t))dt, ∀ s ∈ [s,s],
is a suﬃcient condition for (6.36) – and thus statement (a) of Theorem 3.2 – to hold.
(a) =⇒ (b). Suppose condition (a) holds, which implies that it is veriﬁed in particular for all
utility functions v(t;s) := max{0,s − t}. Then, we have
(6.38)
n X
i=1
v (xi;s) =
n X
i=r(s;x)
(s − xi) =
n X
i=r(s;y)
(s − yi) =
n X
i=1
v (yi;s).
Since this is true for all s ∈ [s,s] and given (6.3b), we conclude that condition (b) holds.
Theorem 3.3. We prove successively that (b) =⇒ (a) =⇒ (b).
(b) =⇒ (a). Integrating by parts (6.35), we obtain
Wv(x) − Wv(y) = v
0(s)
h
µ(F) − µ(G)
i
+ v
00(s)
Z s
s
Z s
s
h
(1 − F(t)) − (1 − G(t))
i
dtds
−
Z s
s
v
000(s)
"Z s
s
Z s
t
h
(1 − F(u)) − (1 − G(u))
i
dudt
#
ds = 0.
(6.39)
Noticing that
Z s
s
Z s
t
h
(1 − F(u))−(1 − G(u))
i
dudt =
Z s
s
Z s
t
h
(1 − F(u)) − (1 − G(u))
i
dudt
−
Z s
s
Z s
t
h
(1 − F(u)) − (1 − G(u))
i
dudt,
(6.40)
for all s ∈ [s,s], and upon substituting into (6.39), we obtain
v
0(s)
h
µ(F) − µ(G)
i
+ v
00(s)
" Z s
s
Z s
s
h
(1 − F(t)) − (1 − G(t))
i
dtds
#
−
Z s
s
v
000(s)
" Z s
s
Z s
t
h
(1 − F(u)) − (1 − G(u))
i
dudt
#
ds
+
Z s
s
v
000(s)
" Z s
s
Z s
t
h
(1 − F(u)) − (1 − G(u))
i
dudt
#
ds = 0,
(6.41)
or equivalently
v
0(s)
h
µ(F) − µ(G)
i
+
"Z s
s
Z s
s
h
(1 − F(t)) − (1 − G(t))
i
dtds
# 
v
00(s) −
Z s
s
v
000(s)ds
!
+
Z s
s
v
000(s)
" Z s
s
Z s
t
h
(1 − F(u)) − (1 − G(u))
i
dudt
#
ds = 0,
(6.42)
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which ﬁnally reduces to
v
0(s)
h
µ(F) − µ(G)
i
+ v
00(s)
"Z s
s
Z s
s
h
(1 − F(t)) − (1 − G(t))
i
dtds
#
+
Z s
s
v
000(s)
" Z s
s
Z s
t
h
(1 − F(u)) − (1 − G(u))
i
dudt
#
ds = 0.
(6.43)
Since by assumption v0(s) = 0, v00(s) = 0 and v000(s) = 0, for all s ∈ (s,s), we conclude that
µ(F) = µ(G) and (6.44a)
Z s
s
Z s
t
(1 − F(u))dudt =
Z s
s
Z s
t
(1 − G(u))dudt, ∀ s ∈ (s,s), (6.44b)
are suﬃcient conditions for (6.43) – and thus statement (a) of Theorem 3.3 – to hold.
(a) =⇒ (b). Suppose condition (a) holds, which implies that it is veriﬁed in particular for all
utility functions v(t;s) := max{0,s − t}
2. Then, we have
(6.45)
n X
i=1
v (xi;s) =
n X
i=r(s;x)
(s − xi)
2 =
n X
i=r(s;y)
(s − yi)
2 =
n X
i=1
v (yi;s).
Since this is true for all s ∈ [s,s] and given (6.4b), we conclude that condition (b) holds.
Another Interesting Equality. Integrating 1 − F(s) over [s,s], we get:
(6.46)
Z s
s
(1 − F(t))dt = (s − s) −
Z s
s
F(t)dt.
Integrating (6.46) we obtain
(6.47)
Z s
s
Z s
t
(1 − F(u))dudt =
1
2
(s − s)
2 −
Z s
s
Z s
t
F(u)dudt,
or equivalently
(6.48)
Z s
s
Z s
t
F(u)dudt =
1
2
(s − s)
2 −
Z s
s
Z s
t
(1 − F(u))dudt,
which holds for all s ∈ [s,s]. In particular, setting s = s, we get
(6.49)
Z s
s
Z s
t
F(u)dudt =
1
2
(s − s)
2 −
Z s
s
Z s
t
(1 − F(u))dudt.
Upon manipulating the lhs of (6.49) and using (6.6), we obtain
Z s
s
"Z s
s
F(u)du
#
dt −
Z s
s
Z t
s
F(u)dudt =
Z s
s
h
s − µ(F)
i
ds −
Z s
s
Z t
s
F(u)dudt
=

s − µ(F)

s − s

−
Z s
s
Z t
s
F(u)dudt.
(6.50)
Substituting (6.50) into (6.49), we get
(6.51)

s − µ(F)

s − s

−
Z s
s
Z t
s
F(u)dudt =
1
2
(s − s)
2 −
Z s
s
Z s
t
(1 − F(u))dudt,
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which, upon using (6.18), reduces to
(6.52)

s − µ(F)

s − s

−
1
2
h
(s − µ(F))
2 + σ
2(F)
i
=
1
2
(s − s)
2 −
Z s
s
Z s
t
(1 − F(u))dudt.
All computation done, we ﬁnally get
(6.53)
Z s
s
Z s
t
(1 − F(u))dudt =
(µ(F) − s)
2 + σ2(F)
2
,
which is to be compared with (6.18). It is therefore necessary for condition (b2) of Theorem
3.3 to hold that
(6.54) (µ(F) − s)
2 + σ
2(F) = (µ(G) − s)
2 + σ
2(G).
This implies in particular that, if the proﬁles x and y have the same mean – which rules
out the possibility that one proﬁle is obtained from the other by means of increments – then
the variance of x cannot be smaller than the variance of y. This has to be contrasted with
standard third order stochastic dominance, which requires that the variance of the dominating
situation be no larger than that of the dominated situation under the equal mean restriction.
A. Scientiﬁc Performance: Additional Tables
In order to get a more comprehensive picture of scientiﬁc performance in our sample of Eu-
ropean economics departments, we contrast the rankings obtained on the basis of reverse
generalised Lorenz dominance with that resulting from the application of the standard gen-
eralised Lorenz criterion. We have represented in Table A.1 the ranking of the European
economics departments by the generalised Lorenz criterion or equivalently by standard second
degree stochastic dominance. Table A.2 summarises the information provided by the appli-
cation of reverse generalised Lorenz dominance and generalised Lorenz dominance. It makes
clear that the rankings of the departments generated by these two criteria diﬀer substantially,
even though they coincide in a number of cases. Finally, Table A.3 permits to compare the dis-
criminatory powers of the diﬀerent dominance criteria when judging the scientiﬁc performance
of the economics departments.
It is remarkable that the generalised Lorenz and reverse generalised Lorenz dominance
criteria are equally discriminatory contrary to what happens for the comparison of countries
on the basis of aﬄuence and poverty. Among a total of 190 possible pairwise comparisons,
the (reverse) quantile criterion gives a conclusive verdict for 14 pairs of departments which
amounts to 7.36% of the total number of comparisons. Application of the reverse generalised
Lorenz criterion allows us to obtain conclusive verdicts in a further 75 cases. In total, reverse
generalised Lorenz dominance is conclusive in 89 cases, that is the 75 cases above plus the
14 cases ranked by the quantile criterion, hence 46.84% of the total number of comparisons.
Similarly, the generalised Lorenz criterion allows us to obtain conclusive verdicts in 72 cases
in addition to the 14 cases where the quantile criterion is decisive. Therefore, generalised
Lorenz dominance is decisive in 86 cases (45.27%) in a total of 190 possible cases. A total of
121 pairs of departments, for which the quantile criterion is non-decisive, can be ordered by
either the reverse generalised Lorenz criterion, or the generalised Lorenz criterion. These two
criteria agree on the ranking of departments in only 27 cases (14.21%) out of the 176 where
the quantile criterion cannot conclude.
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